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Abstract 
Emissions taxes and emissions permit trading schemes are designed 
to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by providing incentives 
for large emitters to invest in less emissions-intensive production 
technologies. Whereas taxes place a fixed price on emissions, 
tradable permit schemes include a secondary permit market, from 
which allowance prices emerge after the regulation enters into force. 
Under a newly imposed regulation, the delay in price information 
contributes to uncertainty about the future cost of compliance that 
liable emitters will face, thereby challenging liable entities’ ability to 
make optimal abatement investment decisions. Using laboratory 
experiments, this thesis examines the effects of a policy regime that is 
similar to the one implemented in Australia in 2012. The regime 
includes a staged transition over time from a regulation-free 
environment, to an emissions tax and then to emissions trading. The 
thesis examines the effects of such a staged transition on investment 
decisions, the level of emissions, permit prices and trading behavior, 
comparing it to standard policy regimes of only an emissions tax and 
only emissions permit trading. The findings suggest that a regime 
based on a staged transition from a tax to permit trading results in 
lower compliance costs and higher overall allocative efficiency 
compared to a regime based solely on emissions trading in a market 
of heterogeneous producing firms. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Motivation 
Curbing the rise of greenhouse gas emissions has become an important task 
for leaders across the globe. While standard-based instruments legally compel 
emitting firms to upgrade their equipment to a certain “standard,” incentive-
based instruments are aimed at providing large emitters, such as electricity 
generators, with financial incentives to invest in lower emissions production 
technologies, usually by using CO2 as a proxy for the overall environmental 
impact of production (Kneese and Schultz (1975); Bohi and Burtraw (1992)). 
Economists and lawmakers generally agree that incentive-based policy 
instruments are superior to standards-based instruments at reliably curbing 
emissions at low cost to society (Downing and White (1986); Tietenberg 
(2006)).  
1.2 Prices or Quantities 
The relative merits of the two classes of incentive-based policies: the price-
based (emissions taxes) and quantity-based market instruments (emissions 
trading schemes), can be compared along many practical dimensions, though 
the comprehensive study and comparison of such instruments in advance of or 
during early stages of their implementation is costly and logistically difficult. 
Quantity-based instruments regulate by prescribing the volume of emissions 
that may be released, and distribute tradable permits in accordance with this 
quantity cap to emitters. Under a price-based instrument, the regulator seeks to 
set a price per unit of emission equivalent to the marginal damage cost of the 
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emission. Because any regulator lacks omniscience and therefore perfect 
information about either the damage costs or the marginal revenue generated 
by producers per unit of emissions created, a need to revise the price in order 
to ensure that the quantity of emissions is confined to the identified preferred 
level is likely (Baumol and Oates (1971)). A particular policy’s advantage 
over another likely depends on its detailed design and implementation in its 
policy environment. The question of whether it is best to implement a price-
based or quantity-based policy in a jurisdiction subsequently generates heated 
public and scholarly debate (Kelly (2009); Drape (2012); Economist (2013)). 
A greater understanding of the implications of each of these policy types, and 
of additional options, is necessary if the debates stand to be resolved 
satisfactorily. 
Emissions trading schemes have been implemented in New Zealand (2008) 
the European Union (2005), and California (2013); revenue-neutral emissions 
taxes are in place in Norway (2005), several Canadian provinces (for example, 
British Columbia (2008)) and Ireland (2010); a contemporaneous hybrid (tax 
and trading system) rules in Switzerland (2008), and a staged transition from 
an emissions tax to an emissions trading scheme has been initiated in Quebec 
(2011) and Australia (2012).  
The popularity of emissions trading schemes is allegedly due largely to the 
business sector’s belief that a trading scheme’s direct market-based nature 
would impose lower compliance demands on polluters than a tax (Economist 
(2013)). However, there is insufficient evidence to conclude that a trading 
scheme necessarily brings about a superior (less expensive) overall result 
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when compared to a commensurate tax. If the problems of transaction costs 
and market power are assumed away, and if decision-makers are assumed to 
be risk neutral and possess full information, theory predicts that emissions can 
be capped at least cost by firms reducing their emissions under either an 
emissions tax or emission trading (Tietenberg (1974, p. 480)). These 
assumptions have been shown to be untenable, though, particularly because of 
the effects that market uncertainty have on investment decisions (Betz and 
Gunnthorsdottir (2009, p. 1418); Hahn and Stavins (2011, p. S274)). For 
example, and importantly in this thesis, uncertainty about future emissions 
permit prices in an emissions trading scheme can lead firms to invest more or 
less than the optimal levels in abatement Malueg (1989, p. 56); thereby raising 
the total social cost of compliance (Aldy and Stavins (2012); Hahn and 
Stavins (2011)).  
Perhaps the most important criteria on which to rate emissions control policies 
is the extent to which they motivate large polluters to invest in lower-
emissions technologies, and the cost of that adoption (Kneese and Schultze 
(1975, p. 38); Bohi and Burtraw (1992)). Electricity generation and 
manufacturing, the top-two point-source emitters by sector (Baumert et al. 
(2005, p. 41)), present themselves as prime targets for policies designed to 
reduce emissions. Firms’ investments in production technologies are of 
particular concern in these industries because of their potential to greatly 
reduce emissions from production, significant expense, their long time 
horizon, and their irreversibility.  
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Prospect theory suggests that high uncertainty with regards to the future prices 
for tradable permits (i.e. future return on investment in abatement) can have a 
significant effect on firms’ incentives to invest (e.g., Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979)). Uncertainty associated with investment incentives and the 
subsequently distorted investment patterns can result in excessive costs – too 
much investment by inefficient producers, or too little investment by more 
efficient producers – thereby raising the overall compliance cost, and reducing 
the financial efficiency of the regulation (Aldy and Stavins (2012), Hahn and 
Stavins (2011)). The European Union’s emissions trading scheme presents a 
particularly vibrant example of unanticipated conditions that can befall an 
emissions trading scheme. There, volatile and mostly low recent prices for 
emissions permits in Europe have been pointed to as contributors to the 
weakening of a market-based abatement incentive for emitters to continue to 
invest in abatement (Krukowska (2012)). 
On the other hand, a tax presents itself as a potentially simpler mechanism for 
inducing emission reduction. The emissions tax could be set at a rate (per unit 
of emission) that would impel polluters to curb emissions to the target level 
(Milliman and Prince (1989, p. 251)). Compared to an emissions trading 
scheme, the steady price signal provided by a tax would lend firms greater 
certainty about their future compliance costs and therefore the returns they 
would receive from investment in abatement. The certainty in additional 
production costs allows decision makers to calculate and then pursue profit-
maximizing investment decisions. Under certain conditions, an appropriately 
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set tax could therefore result in a lowest cost compliance investment pattern 
(Requate and Unold (2003); Requate (2005)).1   
Early reviews suggest that the revenue-neutral carbon tax implemented in 
British Columbia in 2007 have led to significantly lower emissions due to 
reduced fuel consumption in the region, at a relatively low social cost 
(Economist (2011); Hussain (2012). In spite of the benefit that tax instruments 
can provide relative to emissions trading, new emissions taxes – particularly 
those with no appointed end-date – consistently suffer strong political 
opposition. This contention was recently evidenced in the fierce political and 
public backlash to the early talks of installing a carbon tax in Australia 
(Shanahan (2012)), in which use of the word tax by the media drew emotional 
responses from those opposed to costly environmental legislation. Later, in an 
attempt to garner support prior to the national election, the Rudd government 
proclaimed in July 2013 that it would transition away from the tax (to the 
emissions trading scheme) earlier than originally planned (Galbraith (2013)).  
In light of the drawbacks associated with emissions trading and taxation, a 
multi-period combination of the two policies could be a helpful compromise. 
While installing a perpetual tax on emissions in a previously unregulated 
jurisdiction is often seen as a politically impractical venture, a temporary tax 
that would convert to emissions trading at a pre-specified and agreed-upon 
time might pass more easily through a contentious political process. Indeed, 
this type of transitional regulation did become law in Australia. A key benefit 
                                                
1 Requate (2005) provides a more comprehensive overview of adoption and implementation 
incentives resulting from environmental policy instruments. 
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of this design is that the fixed temporary tax would reduce the uncertainty with 
regard to short term return on investment, conceivably resulting in an 
investment pattern that will yield close to minimum social compliance costs 
and a target-abiding emissions level. Once the tax expires, the permanent 
emissions trading scheme would provide a long-term, market-based incentive 
for firms to continue to restrict their emissions to the target level.  
1.3 Research Question 
The question pursued in this thesis is whether a well-designed tax, temporarily 
enforced for several periods prior to an emissions trading system’s 
implementation, would yield increased overall efficiency of the regulation by 
smoothing the transition to an emissions trading system. An alternative effect 
could be that the additional stage in the regulation’s implementation would 
add additional, costly, confusion amongst liable decision makers. The 
combined use of price and quantity instruments in a static sense is widely 
known in the literature (e.g., Roberts and Spence (1976); Pizer (2002); 
Krysiak and Oberauner (2010)), but the temporal combination of the two 
instruments has not yet been satisfactorily addressed. As far as the author is 
aware, this is the first study that explicitly examines this type of temporally 
hybridized design, in which a quantity-based instrument sequentially follows a 
price-based instrument.  
In the model used in this project, a market regulated by an emissions tax 
should theoretically incur lower total compliance costs compared with one 
regulated by an emissions trading scheme. The time horizon considered in the 
study is the first phase for which the emissions cap is imposed. In this time 
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frame, decision makers are liable to CO2 regulation for the first time and 
before the imposed regulation can be revised (for example, based on 
innovation or investment that occurs). Specifically, it is hypothesized that 
within this time horizon decision makers who lack perfect information and 
who are not necessarily perfectly rational will upgrade at more suboptimal 
magnitudes under an emissions trading regulation than one under a fixed price 
tax. Following this line of reasoning, a temporal combination of tax and 
trading would motivate investments that are closer to optimal levels than 
would a trading-only scheme. In this case, the compliance costs incurred under 
the transitional scheme should be lower than under a trading-only regime and 
higher than under a tax-only regime.  
1.4 Objectives  
An overall objective of this study is to test a novel incentive-based emissions 
control policy in a controlled and observable setting. In order to accomplish 
this, a model of emitting, regulated firms is first defined. Next, a laboratory 
experiment based on the model’s framework is to be designed and 
implemented. To enable comparison of the novel policy to the two commonly 
discussed policies, three related but separate experimental treatments (one for 
each policy) should be considered. Abatement investments undertaken, 
production decisions, compliance costs and the volume of permits traded, and 
the prices at which they are traded in the secondary permit market are to be 
used as measures for comparison of the regulations’ efficiency.  
Performance under a tax-regulation is compared to that under an emissions 
trading system with tradable permits for emissions. These two regulatory 
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designs are then to be contrasted to a third design of an initial taxation regime 
that converts to a regime characterized by trading. The model includes a group 
of heterogeneous firms that produce and generate sales revenue while 
incurring costs for the emissions created under production.  
1.5 Outline of the Thesis 
There are six chapters in this thesis. Chapter 2 refers to some related 
experimental and theoretical literature. Chapter 3 outlines the theoretical 
underpinnings on which the experiment is based. Chapter 4 includes a 
description of the experimental methods and procedure. Chapter 5 conveys the 
results. Chapter 6 discusses results, some implications carried by the results 
and suggestions for future research, and concludes. 
1.6 Summary of Chapter One 
Incentive-based emissions control policies impose additional costs on 
production that creates emissions, and seek to restrict the quantity of 
emissions created. These policies aim to maximize reduction of emissions at 
lowest cost to society. The two traditional incentive-based pollution control 
instruments, taxes and emissions trading, each carry drawbacks. Taxes are 
politically unattractive and their optimal rates are difficult to define. Emissions 
trading schemes present liable emitters with great uncertainty about future 
prices for emissions, leading emitters to commit to large investments that may 
be excessively costly (or fail to invest in upgrades that would allow for greater 
profitability). Utilizing laboratory experiments, this study examines a new 
type of policy that includes a staged transition from tax to trading regime and 
asks whether temporally combining the two main policies could better guide 
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liable polluters to optimal abatement investment decisions, ultimately yielding 
lower compliance cost. 
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Chapter 2. Review of the Literature 
 
2.1 Overview 
From the early twentieth century, economists have been investigating the 
relative benefits of design characteristics of emissions regulating instruments. 
Pigou (1920) catalyzed a discussion of welfare-improving taxes, and Coase 
(1960) introduced the idea of property rights that could be related to pollutants 
and clean air. Coase’s The Problem of Social Cost (1960) is widely cited as 
the seminal work that led to the adoption of limited, tradable permits for 
pollution. Many studies have examined design features of market-based 
regulatory instruments such as permit allocation mechanisms (e.g., Cramton 
and Kerr (2002)), permit banking (e.g., Muller and Mestelman (1998), Bohm 
(2003)), and implications of cap stringency on investment decisions (Perino 
and Requate (2012)). Mandell (2008), Krysiak and Oberauner (2010) 
comment extensively on the usefulness of contemporaneous hybridization of 
price and quantity controls. Several papers have focused directly on 
identifying the effect of policy instruments on liable entities’ investment 
decisions (e.g., Requate (2005), Betz and Gunnthorsdottir (2009), Camacho-
Cuena, et al. (2012)).  
To the best of this author’s knowledge, no works have yet explored the 
implications of a staged transition from no emission controls to an emissions 
tax to an emissions trading scheme. The bulk of the work in the field of 
regulating emissions has been theoretical. In the last decade, experimental 
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methods have been applied to specific questions about the design of 
regulations. The interaction between regulation design, liable entities’ risk 
aversion and uncertainty, and the regulations’ ultimate efficiency has received 
some attention. Missing from the regulatory discussion is a robust 
investigation of the multi-step mechanism that is proposed in this thesis: 
namely, a hybridization of the two incentive-based policies. This chapter will 
provide an overview of the existing scholarly background related to emissions 
controls, a discussion of recent related experimental studies, and some 
remarks about the relevant literature on uncertainty. 
2.2 Regulatory Regimes 
Early twentieth century economists wrangled with conspicuous pollutant 
externalities and proposed taxation as the optimal instrument by which to 
regulate emissions. Two instrument classes are presented in the literature. In 
one class, a benevolent regulator imposes a tax whose unit price is equal to the 
pollutant’s marginal social damages is imposed on each unit of pollution to 
correct the inefficient market outcome created by the negative externality of 
pollutants (Pigou (1920)). The challenge confronted in defining this type of 
tax arises in the assessment of externality cost.  
Coase (1960) framed pollution as a property rights problem. By defining clean 
air and water as tradable property, (or conversely, a right to emit a unit of 
pollutant as property), the Coase Theorem suggests that agents who trade 
rights to that property in a market will arrive at an efficient unit price for 
emissions. This result should hold so long as there are no transaction costs. A 
government could limit pollution at a cost that would be defined by property-
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holders in the market by defining emissions as property and setting a capped 
limit on the quantity of emissions property to be released (and to be traded).  
Weitzman (1974) articulated Pigouvian taxes and a Coase-inspired emissions 
cap as prices and quantities, respectively, and commented extensively on their 
comparative advantages. Weitzman described firms’ expected reactions to 
each regulation via a reaction function. To regulate via prices, a rational 
regulator would select a tax rate ! that will maximize the expected difference 
between the cost and benefits that will be realized under the regulation given 
the regulated firms’ expected reactions. To regulate via quantities, the 
regulator would determine an emissions cap ! and apportions the units of ! to 
liable emitting firms. The opportunity to trade these emissions permits in a 
market should ensure that the firms that stand to gain the most from 
investment in abatement invest, while those who stand to benefit less invest 
less or not at all.  
According to Weitzman, a need to decide between a tax or a trading regulation 
is only relevant when regulators are not able to perfectly refine the policy in 
force at any time (p. 482). If a regulator could adjust a regulation with perfect 
flexibility, a price or a quantity instrument could be implemented and the other 
saved as a second-choice. In any imperfect case, the marginal abatement cost 
and benefit slopes should inform the instrument choice (p. 483). When the 
marginal costs are steeper, a price regulation is theoretically preferable to 
quantities; when benefits are steeper, quantity-based regulation is preferred. 
Because true marginal costs are assumed to be impossible to perfectly evaluate 
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a priori, Weitzman suggests that quantity regulation will be preferred to price 
regulation in most situations.  
Ireland (1977) disagrees with Weitzman’s preference for a quantity-based 
regulation. While identifying an effective and cost-minimizing Pigouvian tax 
is not an easy task, Ireland contends that there is a significant opportunity to 
define a price that is at least close to the ideal price, and that a tax at this level 
may still yield preferable results to a quantities strategy (p. 186). 
While their thought exercises are helpful starting points for prices versus 
quantity debates, both solutions fail to fully recognize seriously failings in the 
series of assumptions enumerated above, and their conclusions are largely 
untested. Scholars continue to search for the true best regulatory option. 
Downing and White (1986, p. 29) illustrated that under certain competitive 
equilibrium conditions, an emissions tax and an emissions trading scheme 
could theoretically lead to equivalently optimal incentives for firms to invest 
in abatement. The model defined in their paper assumes that the regulator 
ratchets the tax level or quantity cap in response to technical innovation, and 
that the polluting decision maker holds full and perfect information about the 
regulator’s decisions and bases innovation and investment decisions on that 
innovation. In this case, the competitive equilibrium price for a permit under a 
cost-minimizing quantities regulation with emissions cap !!would equal the 
optimal ! that would otherwise be levied by a price-based regulation.  
2.3 Experimental Methods 
Economic experiments allow researchers to observe behavior under controlled 
conditions: by manipulating incentives and information conditions (e.g. the 
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regulatory regimes) via ceteris paribus variation, causal factors driving 
behavior can be identified. Experiments are particularly useful in studies of 
large-scale emissions regulation design because of the challenge confronted 
when attempting to compare implemented emissions regulation designs to 
each other empirically. Emissions legislation is implemented with specific 
design features, in unique jurisdictions, and each regime is subject to forces 
largely defined by the precise timing of implementation. The challenge that 
these characteristics lend to analysis is amplified by the small sample of 
emissions regulations that are in force. Robust definitions of trends that 
emerge under different types of regulation are difficult to develop (Requate 
2005, p. 176).  
Vernon Smith (1982) pioneered and defined the role of laboratory experiments 
as useful test beds for market instruments such as emissions regulations. 
Populated by human decision makers subject to rules and incentives as they 
are in the real world, lab experiments provide a feasible, controllable 
opportunity to carefully study causal relationships between regulations’ 
characteristics and decision makers’ behaviour. Laboratory studies, therefore, 
provide an important and unique opportunity to manipulate various aspects of 
a regulation and test the theoretical predicted outcomes of various policy 
designs. While governments may not hold full information about producers’ 
production characteristics and abatement cost schedules, in a lab experiment, 
the regulator (experiment designer) can derive parameters, and evaluate social 
welfare-maximizing behavior, even in a multi-party model. By running such 
an experiment, the experimenter is able to evaluate an instrument’s 
performance by comparing the observed behavior to theoretical predictions. 
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An extensive literature in complex market-based experiments provides 
researchers insights into implications of instrument design and about the 
robustness and relevance of experiments’ design features. Plott (1983) first 
reported a laboratory experiment related to emissions regulations, arguing that 
simple laboratory experiments can be used to test even complex policy design 
ideas. From the earliest setups, scholars concerned with the fashion in which 
emission regulations should be implemented have used increasingly 
sophisticated experimental methods to study instrument design. An early 
overview was published by Muller and Mestelman (1998).  
Importantly, Gangadharan and Nemes (2005) developed an experimental setup 
in which emissions were modelled as production costs for producers (as they 
are under emissions regulations), a significant methodical step forward. 
Importantly, this study showed that modeling emissions costs as production 
costs can be a feasible frame for decontextualized experiments seeking to 
study emissions regulations and allowed for further developments in 
instrument-related experiment design. 
2.3.1 Uncertainty and Overinvestment 
Experiments allow for close study of instruments’ effects on real decision 
makers, enabling for neo-classical competitive equilibrium assumption of 
decision makers’ risk neutrality to be relaxed. Uncertainty inherently created 
by emissions trading schemes yields problems for liable firms, whose aversion 
to risk is seen to drive costly actions that are seen to reduce their risks (e.g., 
Sandmo (1971, p. 65)). Excessive compliance costs are incurred by emitters’ 
suboptimal investment decisions (too much, or too little investment in 
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emissions abating technologies). These suboptimal investments carry the 
second cost of potentially crowding out more productive investment 
(Gangadharan and Nemes (2005, p. 24)).  
Uncertainty yields effects on decision makers that are not perfectly 
understood, and seem not to be limited to risk-preference. In a laboratory 
study dedicated to testing the effect of risk attitude toward investment 
decisions and permit trading in an emissions trading scheme, Ben-David et al. 
(2000, p. 598) observed that uncertainty about future costs caused decision 
makers to delay their investment decisions, yielding higher-than-necessary 
emissions. This finding was in contrast to their theoretical prediction that risk 
aversion should propel decision makers toward higher investment decisions 
and lower permit trading volumes. In explanation, the authors suggest that the 
decision makers’ attitude toward investing early or waiting may be determined 
by their perceived role as a buyer or seller in the permit market. Hahn and 
Stavins (2011, p. S274) also draw attention to agents’ failure to invest 
according to a cost-minimizing social optimum under regulation, and suggest 
that this proclivity exists largely because firms are uncertain about future costs 
of emissions and, depending on their initial allowance of permits and their 
investment cost structure, invest in abatement to hedge against future high or 
low permit prices. Baldursson and von der Fehr (2004) demonstrate that risk 
aversion on the part of decision-making agents may render a tax mechanism to 
be preferable to a tradable regulation characterized by price uncertainty and 
volatility. 
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Pezzey and Jotzo (2012) explore the implications of price uncertainty via a 
multi-party theoretical model that empirically explored welfare results of taxes 
versus permit trading under uncertainty, allowing for imperfect information 
and less-than-perfectly rational actors. Their model highlights the tendencies 
for firms to invest more suboptimally under an emissions trading scheme than 
under a tax.  
Risk preferences have not been conclusively shown as correlated with 
decision makers’ investment decisions. Betz and Gunnthorsdottir (2009, p. 
1423) indicate that tendencies to sub-optimally invest are not restricted to 
decision-makers with risk-averse attitudes. In their laboratory study, 
participants’ responses to a risk-preference profile measure did not correlate 
with their investment decisions.2 Camacho-Cuena, et al. (2012, p. 240) find 
that a risk assessment measure is not satisfactorily correlated with investment 
decisions when permits are grandfathered: there was no difference between 
risk-neutral, risk-preferring or risk-adverse participants’ reactions to emissions 
regulations.  
2.3.2 Permit Allocation 
Neo-classical economic theory, on which much economic analysis of policy 
instruments including the above-mentioned equivalence properties of prices 
and quantities rests, defends that in a competitive market, the final allocation 
of tradable permits should be efficient, independent of the initial allocation of 
permits (Arrow and Debreu (1954, p. 279); Montgomery (1972, p. 400)). 
                                                
2 Betz and Gunnthorsdottir used a version of Holt and Laury’s (2002) risk-preference eliciting 
lottery that had been modified by Gangadharan and Nemes (2005). 
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Hahn and Stavins (1992, p. 465; 2011, p. S271-S279) point out that this 
independence property fails to consider the effect that factors such as non-zero 
transaction costs, market power, uncertainty and regulatory distortions may 
have on the benefits from trading and therefore opportunity to reach an 
efficient equilibrium independent of initial allocation.  
In recent years scholars have reached a consensus that the allocation of 
permits seems to be important and potentially quite problematic. The 
identified properties under which the independence property breaks down 
could carry strong effect on trading regulations’ overall efficacy and is 
deserving of special note. While the scholarly community has not reached a 
unanimous explanation for such an effect, there is agreement that initial 
allocation plays an important role in a regulation’s ultimate efficiency and 
growing evidence to suggest that initial allocation does matter.  
In an experimental study designed to examine compliance to emissions 
regulations, Murphy and Stranlund (2007, p. 203) found what they refer to as 
a strong initial allocation effect in both inexperienced and experienced 
subjects in low and medium-penalty treatments (but not high penalty treating). 
The effect was observed in the transacted prices for permits, the mean and 
median prices for which were higher in the experimental setup than would 
have been under a competitive equilibrium. Camacho-Cuena, et al. (2012, p. 
244) found that when permits are grandfathered, the final allocation in the 
experimental setting was closer to the original allocation than it is when 
permits are auctioned, although investment decisions did not differ based on 
allocation method (p. 246). When they are allocated permits from the 
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government, decision makers’ may overvalue the permits that they receive in 
the initial allocation, leading firms to hold the permits that they are allocated 
rather than sell them to producers who indicate a higher marginal value for the 
permits, in turn limiting the number of transactions. Thaler (1980, p. 43) 
characterizes a similar phenomenon as an endowment effect. Scholars 
postulate that this endowment-related effect may be alleviated if firms are 
made to evaluate their marginal values for permits before they acquire them 
(as they would in an auction). For this reason, an auction-based mechanism to 
distribute permits is seen likely to yield a more efficient outcome (Cramton 
and Kerr 2002, p. 11), and permit auctioning is growing in popularity as the 
preferred initial allocation method in an emissions trading regulation.  
However, in practice permits tend to be freely distributed (‘grandfathered’) 
based on a defined rule of thumb at the initial stages of a regulation rather than 
sold or auctioned to liable entities. Phase 1 of the European Emissions Trading 
Scheme saw less than 1 percent of permits auctioned, and Phase 2 only 3 
percent. Contrary to early calls to auction the majority of permits in Australia 
(e.g., Garnaut (2011, Ch. 14)), late negotiations yielded free-allocation of 
almost all permits. In the interest of drawing conclusions that could be useful 
in current policy applications, the decision to apply a free initial allocation 
mechanism in this experimental setup was defined by the present popularity of 
the so-called grandfathering system.  
2.4 Conditions of Price and Quantity Equivalency  
The literature presents five key conditions under which price and quantity 
regulations may yield equivalent results:  
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(1) Zero transaction costs in the emissions marketplace (Stavins 1995; 
Hahn and Stavins (2011, p. S271)); 
(2) Zero market power in the market for emissions permits (e.g. Hahn 
(1984), Gangadharan and Nemes (2006), Malik (2002)); 
(3) Risk-neutral decision makers responsible for all abatement investment 
and production decisions (e.g. Weitzman (1974));  
(4) The availability of full information (e.g. Requate and Unold (2003, p. 
133); Hahn and Stavins (2011, p. S274)); and  
(5) Decision makers’ full confidence in the emissions regulation’s 
implementation and long-term maintenance (e.g. Jotzo, et al. (2012, p. 
398)).  
The breakdown of any one of these five conditions would likely break down 
the equivalence between price and quantity systems. Particularly relevant to 
the question investigated in this thesis is the inability of decision makers to 
make optimal investment decisions when they face uncertainty about future 
emissions costs, as they do under an emissions trading scheme (Betz and 
Gunnthorsdottir (2009, p. 1419); Hahn and Stavins (2011, p. S274)). Under 
trading, if even some firms fail to equate their marginal abatement costs with 
the marginal emissions costs, the ultimate distribution of emissions and 
emissions permits will be inefficient, rendering aggregate compliance 
suboptimal (Hahn and Stavins (2011)).  
In the setup examined in thesis, Assumptions (1) and (5) are maintained, while 
assumptions (2), (3) and (4) are allowed to relax. The omniscient regulator 
(experimenter) defines the targeted q . Because the regulator holds full 
  22 
information, she evaluates the p that would incentivize profit-maximizing 
(rational) producers to upgrade their production technologies and adjust their 
production levels in order to curb emissions to q at least cost. Transaction 
costs are zero (1), and experiment participants’ are told that all of the 
information they are provided with is truthful (5); the expectation is that they 
will not question whether the regulation will be overturned. Producers can 
invest in abatement via existing technologies, and their investment decisions 
inform relative market power in the permit market (2). Perfect risk neutrality, 
or rationality, of the decision makers is not assumed (3). Producers receive 
information about the aggregate level of abatement in the market, but do not 
hold full information about competitors’ production and investment 
characteristics (4).  
2.5 Summary of Chapter Two 
This chapter reviewed some of the developments in the emissions regulations 
literature. Previous studies have investigated design features of market-based 
instruments for emissions regulation such as permit allocation mechanism, 
permit banking and cap stringency, and defined conditions under which price- 
and quantity-based regulations can yield equally cost-effective outcomes. 
Others considered the effect of alternative policy instruments on investment 
decisions. In their efforts, the studies employed theoretical, empirical and 
experimental methods. So far, an exploration of a temporal combination of a 
tax and trading instrument has been left unexplored. The growing prominence 
of this transitional design as a viable policy option and an interest in studying 
the regulatory instruments within a controlled setting guided the development 
of this project.  
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Chapter 3. Theoretical Foundations 
 
This chapter presents the model framework on which the experiment was 
designed. The producers’ production characteristics including revenue 
generation, production costs and investment opportunities are described, and 
the solution for a profit-maximizing producer is articulated. The measure used 
to compare performance under the regulation is derived. 
Notation 
Table 3.1 lists and describes the notation used in this thesis. 
Table 3.1 Technical Notation 
 
 
  
Variable Description 
i Individual producer, endowed with one of n unique initial technologies 
j Technology level (0, 1, 2, 3, 4)  j > 0 are technology upgrades, j = 0 represents original technology 
Ui,j Current technology level for producer i 
qi The current production level selected by producer i 
l(Ui,j,,qi) Emissions produced by agent i at technology level Uj and production level qi: (1-0.1j) l(Ui,0, qi) 
iR  Production revenue at chosen production level 
C[l(Ui , j ,qi )]  
Cost of emitting at the chosen production level with current technology 
level 
 ICi(Ui,j) Investment costs, for the technology level 
π i (Ui , j ,qi )  
Profit for producer i at production level qi: revenue less emissions and 
investment costs  
L* Target aggregate emissions, identified by regulator 
d Marginal damage cost per unit of emission  
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3.1 Model framework 
The experimental setup is comprised of a number of heterogeneous firms, 
each endowed with a unique production technology characterized with 
specific emissions-intensity. Firms can upgrade their production technology to 
achieve lower emissions-intensity. The firms face government regulation 
aimed at curbing emissions. All firms are small, and therefore do not influence 
the tax rate or the price of the output or emissions permits. Regulations aim to 
curb emissions at minimal cost, and are evaluated by the compliance and 
damage costs incurred within a specified period. While the study’s design was 
motivated by the electricity sector, which can make marginal investments to 
lower carbon emissions and is one of the largest emitters of greenhouse gases 
in Australia and globally, the experiments were conducted without mention of 
this particular context. The model is therefore relevant to any situation with 
production and investment decisions subject to alternative incentive-based 
environmental regulation. 
Following Gangadharan and Nemes (2005), producing output in the setup 
entails generating emissions, which in this case is articulated to the agents as 
using required inputs. An input can be seen as a permit (or allowance) to emit 
during the production process, and is costly under the regulation. Firms can 
reduce emissions either by cutting back production, by upgrading to a lower 
emission-intensive technology for production or both. 
The heterogeneous design was implemented to endow the laboratory market 
with key complexity found in a real-world situation. When producers have 
identical technology (and related production costs, revenues and investment 
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opportunities), permits carry the same value to all producers, who therefore 
have no profit-driven reason to trade them. After investment, the group of 
producers that has invested is able to generate more revenue with the same 
number of permits, consequently raising their perceived value of permits. That 
creates potentially gainful trade opportunities where the producers with higher 
value for permits buy additional permits from the producers with lower value 
for permits in order to expand their production levels for extra profit. The 
market-clearing price for permits in this type of secondary market is affected 
only by the number of producers that invest and not by a relative efficiency of 
the producers that invest (since all maintain equivalent efficiency). The 
strategic issue of who should invest and when cannot be resolved when firms 
are homogenous, given that if others invest an individual emitter might be 
better off waiting to buy permits in the market. Introducing heterogeneity in 
producers’ marginal abatement and production costs allows the market the 
best chance of providing opportunities for gains from trade.  
3.2 Emissions Cap 
The regulator chooses the emissions cap L* directly, or imposes a 
corresponding emissions tax rate to ensure that L* is attained. L* is motivated 
by the impact of the negative externality, which is introduced as the constant 
marginal damage cost d; for the purposes of this paper the marginal damage 
cost is parameterized as d=E$16 per unit of emission. At L* and the associated 
tax rate or permit price, some producers can achieve maximum profitability by 
investing in abatement and producing with the higher efficiency equipment. 
Other producers might maximize profits by not investing or even by stopping 
their production all together, and instead they would sell their permits 
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gainfully on the market under a market-based regulation. The aggregate 
emissions level L is the sum of individual producers’ emissions li, L =(l!)!!!! .  
A regulator with full information, as defined in this setup, knows the 
minimum aggregate abatement costs and the associated optimal upgrades for 
each producer under the defined cap level or tax rate. The choice of the 
magnitude of the negative externality in the engineered setup is not arbitrary. 
In the social-welfare maximizing result, some producers should optimally 
upgrade their technology, while the remaining producers should not upgrade at 
all. Given the endowed technological portfolio, a too-low d and an associated 
high L* would not impose a sufficient incentive for emitters to change their 
behaviour. A too-high d and associated low L* could create an environment in 
which all individual technological upgrades would be cost effective, thereby 
eliminating the opportunity for gainful permit trading that this experiment is 
designed to create.  
3.3 Producers and Production Characteristics 
In the experiment, each producer i is endowed with one of n unique initial 
technologies Ui,0, where i = (1, …, n), and each carries a unique baseline 
emissions profile l(Ui,0, qi), where qi represents the chosen output level. The 
profitability of each technology depends on the level of production and on 
each producer’s abatement cost structure. In a heterogeneous industry, each 
producer type maintains a unique upgrade cost structure and unique constant 
marginal revenue per permit. A producer may upgrade her technology up to 
four times from her initial Ui,0: Ui,j, j = (1, 2, 3, 4) that improve emissions-
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efficiency, each by 10 percent from the initial level l(Ui,0, qi), i.e., l(Ui,j, qi) = 
(1-0.1×j) l(Ui,0, qi). Upgrade costs increase with subsequent investments and 
are higher for emitters endowed with more efficient initial technology. 
At the end of each period, producers receive information on the total number 
of upgrades undertaken by all other participants to date. This design choice 
was made to reflect that in the real world, firms are likely to know when their 
peers have undertaken technological upgrades. 
3.4 Profit-Maximizing Strategy 
A producer’s profit is production revenue less investment costs ICj less the 
new cost of emitting at the chosen production level: 
  !! !!,! , !! = !! !! − !"! !!,!!! − ! ! !!,! , !! ! (1)  
In Equation (1), R is the production revenue and C is the cost of emitting at the 
chosen production level given the initial technology. A profit-maximizing 
producer i should upgrade technology until the total investment costs !!! !!,!!!!! !equal the benefit reaped from investment. This benefit is the 
difference in the liability costs that would be incurred with initial technology 
Ui,0 and liability costs incurred while producing with upgraded technology Ui,j.  
   !!!!! !!! !!,! =!!!! ! !!,! − ! !!,!     (2) 
The marginal tax rate is equal to the E$16 marginal damage cost described 
above and is within the range of the permit market’s clearing prices that are 
defined by producers’ production efficiencies under the social cost minimizing 
investment and production pattern. The experiment-designing regulator can 
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evaluate this price range (the market clearing price range under cost-
minimizing investment pattern) ex ante.  
Under a tax, profit-maximizing producers should invest until investment costs 
equal the benefits to be gained, simply calculated by incorporating the tax as a 
future production cost. Under emissions trading, producers should be guided 
by the emerging permit price in the market and the aggregate number of 
technology upgrades that have been undertaken, of which they are informed 
every period.  
Some producers should optimally upgrade their technology, while others 
should not. Producers with the highest potential returns to investment relative 
to their investment costs (i.e. lower abatement costs relative to marginal 
production revenue potential) should move first in investing. Their early 
investment provides a signal to agents with higher abatement costs that there 
will be opportunities to purchase permits at prices that are likely to be lower 
than their own abatement costs. Under perfect information, the levels of 
investment and production for producers that maximizes social welfare 
theoretically converges to their individually optimal levels under the tax 
regime. This design results with welfare-maximizing investment levels that 
are equivalent for each of the eight producers under all of the three schemes. 
Participants’ learning about the efficiency of decisions over the course of the 
four rounds, and their behavior, was expected to trend toward the theoretical 
full-information equilibrium. Specifically, participants’ decisions were 
expected to reflect rapid learning under the high-certainty tax, and slower 
learning under emissions trading, reflecting low certainty about future returns 
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on upgrade investments in this regime.  
3.5 Social Welfare 
Social welfare is evaluated via a comprehensive accounting measure. With the 
assumed perfectly elastic product market, the aggregate measure of realized 
total surplus TS comprises producer surplus, government surplus and 
consumer surplus.  !!!!!!!!!" = (!!!! !!)− !"!!!!! !!,! − !"#! + !!"!!!!! − !"!!!!!!!!!     
 (3) 
The first three terms comprise producer surplus (production revenue minus 
costs), the fourth term government surplus, and the final term represents 
environmental damage cost. Tax is total individual taxes paid. The 
government surplus is cancelled out by producers’ tax costs. The regulation 
aims to minimize the abatement and damage costs, thereby maximizing total 
surplus. Environmental damage cost is affected only by the quantity of 
emissions created in production (L), and due to the positive damage costs d, is 
negative and decreases as emissions increase.   
Dividing the observed TS by the maximum possible TS* and multiplying by 
100% yields an allocative efficiency measure by which performance of 
regulations can be directly compared to each other: 
!""#$#%&$' = !"!"∗×100 = (!!!! !!)! !"!!!!! !!,! !!"!!!!(!!!! !!∗)! !"!!!!! (!!,!∗ )!!"∗!!!! ×100!!!!!!!  
  (4) 
  
  30 
3.6 Summary of Chapter Three  
This chapter presented the model on which the experiment described in this 
thesis is based. The emissions cap and tax rate are defined according to the 
externality damage cost evaluated by a regulator. Producers evaluate their 
opportunities to maximize profits with respect to their production 
characteristics, investment opportunities and the regulation they face. They 
solve their profit-maximizing investment problem subject to the future price of 
regulation compliance, which is a known marginal tax rate or an expected 
price of a permit in the market. The experiment, defined in Chapter 4, is 
designed to test whether equivalently efficient compliance will be realized 
under the three schemes. 
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Chapter 4. Experimental Design and Procedure 
 
Producers’ behavior is measured and compared under the three regulatory 
regimes (treatments) via a laboratory economic experiment programmed in z-
Tree (Fischbacher 2007) and conducted in an experimental laboratory at the 
University of Sydney. All 144 participants that took part in the experiment 
were students at the University of Sydney who were recruited via the 
University’s ORSEE database of student volunteers (Greiner 2004). Each of 
the three treatments was replicated in six experimental sessions; a total of 18 
experimental sessions were run3. Each subject participated in only one session.  
An experimental session consisted of an instructional stage with an instruction 
video, a quiz for comprehension, and four 13 period-long rounds (instructional 
videos and the quiz can be viewed via the links provided in the list of 
References, Bernold 2012). All rounds in a session were identical in that the 
same treatment and producer characteristics were induced for the duration of 
the session. The participants’ task was to maximize their earnings by making 
decisions in their assigned Producer role during the experimental session. 
Participants’ take home earnings were the sum of their earnings in each of the 
four rounds.  
The experiment was designed to create a controlled environment without 
unnecessary complexities. In an effort to contribute useful findings to the 
evolving body of experimental literature studying emissions regulatory 
                                                
3 A set of trial sessions was run before the experiments presented in this paper. These sessions 
served as checks for the functionality and comprehensibility of the instructions and software. 
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schemes, a similar experimental setup to that presented in Camacho-Cuena, et 
al. (2012) and Gangadharan and Nemes (2005) is utilized. Careful attention 
was paid to the information provided to participants, since the effect of 
uncertainty in price signals on investment decisions is central to the research 
problem. In the experiment, participants were given key information about 
their production characteristics (production costs, technological upgrade costs 
and profits) privately. The tax level, permit distribution, the total number of 
upgrades undertaken, and all trade-related information (such as the best 
standing bid and ask, and the quantity and price of traded permits) were 
provided publicly. All information provided to the participants was truthful, 
and participants knew with certainty exactly when regulations would be 
imposed, and how long they would last. 
 In order to minimize the chance of association of the experimental 
environment with emissions regulation, language used during the session was 
intentionally decontextualized from typical environmental or regulatory 
vocabulary. Permits were referred to as inputs, the tax was an input price and 
the input price was set at an amount different from the carbon tax that was in 
place in Australia at the time.  
4.1 Parameters  
 
Participants in their roles of Producers evaluated their opportunities to 
maximize profits with respect to their production characteristics, investment 
opportunities and the regulation they faced. They maximized their profit 
subject to the future price of regulation compliance, which is a known 
marginal tax rate, or an expected price of a permit. Participants’ earnings were 
  33 
calculated based on their performance in all four rounds. Each participant 
faced a unique linear production function, unique upgrade costs and finite 
production capacity (Table 4.1).  
Table 4.1: Producer Characteristics4 
 
 Producer Type 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Permit’s 
Marginal 
Productivity 
with Ui,0 
7.5 10 12.5 15 17.5 20 22.5 25 
Upgrade 1 
Cost  12.5 12.5 12.5 25 25 50 75 125 
Upgrade 2 
Cost  62.5 75 50 75 75 100 150 200 
Upgrade 3 
Cost  112.5 137.5 150 125 125 200 225 250 
Upgrade 4 
Cost  162.5 200 250 175 175 250 300 300 
Efficient* 
Upgrade 
Level 
0 0 0 3 3 2 1 1 
Efficient* 
Upgrade 
Costs 
0 0 0 225 225 150 75 125 
 
 
4.2 Period Timeline 
Each of the four rounds in a session consisted of 13 periods. Each period 
included three stages (screenshots in Appendix 2): 
1. Investment Stage (60 seconds). At the start of every period (except for 
period one), participants could invest in an upgrade that would reduce 
their emissions (represented by their production costs) by 10 percent 
each. Emissions were referred to as inputs, and each production level 
                                                
4 Efficient upgrades under the social welfare maximizing investment profile. 
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required a certain number of inputs. An upgrade reduced the number of 
inputs required per production level by 10 percent for the remainder of 
the round. Participants could select up to four incremental upgrades 
(one upgrade per period). The maximum four upgrades would carry a 
cumulative 40 percent reduction of emissions. Any upgrade was 
irreversible and lasted for the remaining periods in the round. 
2. Production and Trading Stage (60 seconds). Participants selected a 
production level between 0 and 10 each period. At the beginning of 
period 1, producers’ balances were E$0. Participants knew their costs 
(emissions) and profits associated with each production level. In the 
treatments with emissions trading, once the trading scheme was 
initialized in Period 6, a single unit double auction in emission permits 
was active during this stage. In periods with trading, the market for 
permits (inputs) was open for 60 seconds during the production stage.5 
In the market, participants chose the number of bids or asks to submit 
and transact within the trading period. Each bid or ask was for a single 
permit. The best current bid and ask were displayed on the screen at all 
times. To execute a trade, participants acting as buyers or sellers 
clicked on the bid or ask that they were willing to transact for. A 
record of each transacted price from the current period was displayed 
on participants’ screens. 
3. Summary Stage (15 seconds). Participants were shown a summary of 
their personal performance for the previous period and the cumulative 
                                                
5 Screenshots can be found in Appendix 2. 
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number of investments undertaken by all agents up to and including 
that period. 
4.3 Treatment Regimes 
Treatments were characterized by the regulation implemented during the 
session. The first five periods of each round comprised a pre-liability phase, in 
which participants produced with no emissions costs. The emissions 
regulation (tax only, tax followed by trade, or trade only) was implemented 
from period 6 onwards in each round.6 In each of the 13 periods, participants 
selected a production level in order to generate revenue, had an opportunity to 
invest in technological upgrades, and received information about the total 
number of upgrades undertaken by the eight producers. The social welfare 
maximizing production and investment decisions are the same in all three 
experimental treatments (Table 4.2).  
                                                
6  Five unregulated periods were included prior to the regulation in order to provide 
participants sufficient time to upgrade their technology levels (with one upgrade possible per 
period, it would take 4 periods in order to upgrade to the maximum technology level), and the 
opportunity to generate enough E$ funds to pay for the upgrades. The specific timing of 
upgrades prior to the regulated phase is irrelevant and to the best of the author’s 
understanding, does not meaningfully affect any analysis or conclusions. 
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Table 4.2 Treatment Regimes 
 
Treatment 
Non-Liability 
Phase 
(Periods 1-5) 
Liability Phase 
(Periods 6-13) 
Tax Only Pre-Liability Tax 
Trade Only Pre-Liability Trade 
Staged Transition Pre-Liability     Tax (Periods 6-8) 
Trade 
(Periods 9-13) 
 
In the treatments with trading, 5 emissions permits per period were allocated 
to each participant starting in the first period that trading became active. A 
single unit double auction was implemented as the trading mechanism due to 
its low transaction costs and easily understood and utilized design, particularly 
the ease of placing and accepting bids and asks.7 In the event that a producer 
held less than the required number of permits at the end of a period, a higher 
fine (E$32) per full insufficient permit was levied. This fee adjusted for partial 
permit insufficiencies. For example, if Producer 1 needed 5.5 permits but only 
held 5 at the end of the period, the fee levied was 0.5!×!$32 = !$16. No 
banking of permits was allowed between periods or rounds. 
Participants responded to questionnaires that appeared on their screens in the 
midst of each session. Participants responded to two survey questions prior to 
                                                
7 Smith (1962) provides extensive evidence of the double auction’s tendency to elicit best-
possible market results in experimental environments. Camacho-Cuena et al. (2012) strongly 
suggest that the type of auction used after an initial distribution of permits does not have a 
significant effect on the pattern of technology adoption in an environment similar to the one 
reported in this thesis. 
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the first regulation, then immediately following the first regulated phase, and, 
in half of the sessions, after the completion of the fourth round. The 
participants used radio buttons to express their agreement (“Highly Disagree” 
to “Highly Agree” on a scale from 0 to 10) with the prompts: “I like Periods 1-
5,” and “I like Periods 6-13.” It was thought that participants would express 
any frustration arising from poor performance or confusion with the 
experimental setup in their responses, which would be an important 
consideration when analyzing relative performance. By asking for 
participants’ reactions to the regulation before and directly after their first 
experience operating under the regulation, and also after they had significant 
experience operating under the regulation, the survey sought to debrief 
participants about their experiences in the experimental environment.  
4.4 Experimental Procedure  
On entering the lab, each participant was randomly assigned a role as one of 8 
participant types. Each session was randomly assigned to one of the three 
treatments. Comprehensive instructions about the game’s mechanism were 
provided in a video that was displayed on large screens visible by all 
participants, and a written version distributed in hard copy.8 After viewing the 
video, participants retained the written instructions and completed a quiz to 
demonstrate their understanding of their role in the session.  
Participants were privately informed of their personal exchange rates before 
the beginning of the session. The Experimental dollars to Australian dollars 
exchange rate was adjusted for each participant type’s characteristics so that in 
                                                
8 The video instructions are available from the authors upon request. 
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equilibrium each participant had the opportunity to earn the A$30 
performance-based payout. Participants earned an average of A$24.35 in 
addition to the A$10 participation fee (exchange rates are included in 
Appendix Table 2).  
4.5 Summary of Chapter Four 
 
Experiments were run at the University of Sydney’s Behavioural Study lab. 
Eight students participated in each session, of which 18 were run (n = 144). 
Each session included an instructional video, comprehension quiz, and four 
replicates of 13 period-long rounds. Each participant was assigned to be one of 
eight producers in a market. They generated revenue and made decisions 
about investing in upgrades to reduce their costs. The costs represented 
emissions. The three experimental treatments were defined by the cost they 
imposed on producers: (1) a unit tax on inputs, (2) a distribution of inputs with 
an option to trade, and (3) a tax for three periods, and then a trading regime. 
Participants were paid in Australian dollars based on their performance in the 
session. 
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Chapter 5. Results  
 
This section presents summary statistics and the results of the statistical 
hypothesis tests used to compare the three experimental treatments based on 
the alternative regulatory regimes: (1) emissions tax only, (2) emissions permit 
market only, and (3) staged transition from tax to permit market. The 
outcomes of decisions in these three experimental treatments were compared 
in terms of allocative efficiency, market performance, producers' earnings, and 
preferences elicited from survey responses.  
Performance under the three regimes is comparable because participants’ 
efficient decisions (individual investment magnitude and production level 
decisions under social welfare maximization) are equivalent under all regimes 
(Appendix Table 2). Investment expenditure, emissions level and production 
income comprise the allocative efficiency measure used here. Eighteen 
independent observations (6 from each of the 3 treatments) are reported here. 
Each producer type (types 1-8) had unique upgrade costs, production 
efficiencies and an associated efficient upgrade level. Low efficiency 
producers (types 1-3) are those with highest marginal production costs prior to 
investment (low marginal productivity per emissions permit). High efficiency 
producers (types 6-8) hold a high marginal productivity per permit prior to 
investment. Under the social welfare-maximizing solution, medium and high-
efficiency producers should invest in abatement and then produce at high 
levels. To maximize their profits, low-efficiency producers should neither 
invest nor produce, but sell their permit allocation (when the market is active).  
Summary statistics are presented in Table 5.1.  
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Table 5.1 Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Min Max 
Producer Efficiency 
     Low   0.375 
 
0.485 
  
     Medium  0.25 0.433   
High  0.375 0.485   
Earnings per Round (A$) 6.09 1.579 0 9.99 
Permits Used (Emissions) 629.64 47.44 511.1 715.7 
Aggregate Number  
     of Investments in Market 19.29 5.6 9 30 
Permit Price  
     (Ave. by Period) 17.47 2.8 12.68 25.46 
Investment Magnitude  
    Of Inefficiency 1.47 1.25 0 4 
n = 576 
While the small population of observations challenged the opportunity to draw 
statistically significant conclusions under some of the units of the measure, 
others factors clearly demonstrated statistically significant differences between 
treatments. Four rounds of play were observed in each session. Outcomes 
under the three treatments were compared via a standard Wilcoxon–Mann–
Whitney two-sample rank-sum test. Significance of results was double 
checked with a robust Fligner-Policello test for differences in the medians of 
two treatments (Fligner and Policello 1981)9. Factors affecting investment 
efficiency were investigated via panel regression. P-values referred to in this 
section are generated from the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests, the results of 
which were in line with the results of the Fligner-Policello tests. Significance 
refers to p ≤ 0.05 unless otherwise noted.  
                                                
9 Asymptotic p-value provided by the FP test may not be adequate when the sample size of 
each treatment is less than 12. In this case, Fligner and Policello provide critical values of 
significance. The asymptotic p-values generated in Stata 11 using the FPRank module 
(Benmamoun (2006)) that are presented here have been cross-referenced with these small-
sample critical points. P-values presented here emerge only from the Wilcoxon Mann-
Whitney test. 
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5.1 Investment  
Participants’ implicit task was to attain the level of investment in technology 
upgrades that would return them maximum financial benefit during the course 
of the round. To achieve maximum social welfare, several producers should 
stop production altogether and profit by selling their allocated permits, while 
others should generate their maximum profits by procuring permits needed 
after investing into some technological upgrades of their own. The by now 
well-established propensity for participants to overact (here, over-upgrade) in 
the lab (documented by Gangadharan and Nemes (2005); Camacho-Cuena, et 
al. (2012)) is observed in this data set. To account for this bias, the efficiency 
of upgrades was evaluated via a measure of difference in actual and efficient 
upgrades. 
5.1.1 Aggregate Investment 
When observed by round, aggregate upgrades were consistently but 
insignificantly higher under the trading only scheme than the staged transition 
or tax-only schemes. The upgrade choices demonstrate learning with 
experience. Aggregate upgrades and costs reduce toward the efficient level 
under all treatments over the four rounds of the experiment (Table 5.2, Table 
5.3) but costs are considerably higher than the efficient expenditures even in 
the tax-only treatment, which was closest to efficient. Observed learning, 
indicated by the efficiency of upgrade decisions, occurred faster in the tax 
only and transition regimes than in the emissions trading scheme. There was a 
significant difference in aggregate market upgrade expenditures between the 
first two rounds in the tax (p = 0.055) and in the staged transition regime (p = 
0.078), but no significant reduction in expenditure under the trading only 
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scheme (p = 0.15). By round 4, the variability in investment expenditures is 
notably lower under the tax only than the other regimes, and notably lower 
under the transition regime than the trading only regime. 
Table 5.2 Mean Investment Expenditure (E$) 
By Round and Treatment (Standard Deviations in parentheses) 
 
 Round   
Treatment 1 2 3 4 Efficient Overall by Treatment 
Tax Only 3042 (433) 
2329 
(670) 
1819 
(653) 
1521 
(389) 800 
2178 
(795) 
Staged 
Transition 
2980 
(611) 
2304 
(330) 
1738 
(327) 
1592 
(510) 800 
2153 
(714) 
Trade Only 2934 
(552) 
2373 
(726) 
1821 
(692) 
1667 
(751) 800 
2199 
(852) 
 
 
Table 5.3 Average Number of Upgrades 
By Round and Treatment (Standard Deviations in parentheses) 
 
 Round   
Treatment 1 2 3 4 Efficient 
Overall 
Average by 
Treatment 
Tax-Only 26 (2.9) 
19.33 
(5.4) 
15.33 
(3.4) 
13.83 
(1.5) 10 
18.63 
(5.9) 
Staged 
Transition 
25.67 
(3.4) 
19 
(3.0) 
14.83 
(1.0) 
14 
(1.0) 10 
18.38 
(5.3) 
Trading-
Only 
25.83 
(2.8) 
21.83 
(5) 
18.83 
(5.2) 
17 
(5.7) 10 
20.88 
(5.6) 
 
 
5.1.2 Investment by Specific Producer Type  
Investment levels by the low-efficiency producers (who should not have 
invested at all in order to maximize their profits) were much higher under 
trading than the tax    (p = 0.002, Figure 5.1). Moderately efficient producers’ 
(producers 4 and 5) decisions did not vary across treatments. The highest 
efficiency producers invested closest to the optimum under the trading-only 
scheme, and significantly more efficiently under the trading-only than tax 
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scheme (p = 0.048). 
Figure 5.1 Magnitude of Investment Inefficiency 
 
5.1.3 Regression Analysis 
In addition to non-parametric tests, random effects analysis allowed further 
evaluation of the effects treatment imposed on producers’ investment decision. 
In this analysis, deviation of a participant’s investment decision from the 
investment decision under the social-welfare maximizing profile is used as the 
dependent variable explained by features of the producer’s condition. 
Multivariate models allow the mean effect of each factor to be evaluated while 
holding the other defined factors constant, and enable formal testing of the 
significance of the relationship between regulation type (and the other 
explanatory variables) and the efficiency of investment decision. The random 
effects model allows individual participants to be tracked across a session’s 
four rounds, ensuring a further degree of control on the other explanatory 
variables’ effects on the investment efficiency. Findings should help to clarify 
the effect that the regulation has on the investment decision. The regressions 
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utilize standard errors clustered by session. The random effects results 
presented here are in line with the significance results from ordinary least 
squares tests executed with the same specifications. The regression results are 
also in line with the findings of the non-parametric tests, and, in that the 
regression model tracks individual players while controlling for multiple 
explanatory variables at once, contributes strength to the robustness of the 
findings presented in the preceding sections (Table 5.4). 
In an effort to present a thorough overview of the results’ analysis, two 
regression models are presented here. Model 1’s explanatory variables are a 
subset of the explanatory variables included in Model 2, which includes the 
interaction of producer efficiency type to interact with regulation type. Model 
2 includes the more comprehensive explanation of upgrade efficiency and 
yields a higher R2 value, and therefore is preferred to the more simplistic 
Model 1. While it is suspected that Model 1 may carry omitted variable bias 
(due to the lack of inclusion of the interaction terms), it cannot be concluded 
with full certainty that the explanation is wrong. The omission of the producer 
efficiency type interacted with the treatment type as an explanatory variable in 
Model 1 seems to bias the analysis, resulting in sign inconsistency on the 
coefficients on the trade-only treatment dummy across the models. !
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Table 5.4 Investment Efficiency 
Regression Results 
Dependent Variable: Efficiency of Individuals’ Investment Decisions 
 
  (1)  (2) 
Regulation 
     Tax Only 
 
-0.285*** 
(0.093) 
 
-0.299 
(0.249) 
Trade Only 0.009 
(0.110) 
-.609** 
(0.292) 
Producer Efficiency 
     Low   
 
0.5** 
(0.243) 
 
0.037 
(0.321) 
     High  0.599*** 
(0.15) 
0.5*** 
(0.179) 
Producer Efficiency x Regulation 
     Low Efficiency 
                  Tax Only 
 
             Trade Only 
  
-0.148 
(0.384) 
1.54*** 
(0.422) 
High Efficiency 
             Tax Only 
 
 
             Trade Only 
  
0.185 
(0.374) 
0.111 
(0.306) 
Aggregate Number of Investments 0.87*** 
(0.010) 
0.86*** 
(0.010) 
Previous Round’s Average Permit     
Price 
-0.002* 
(0.27) 
-0.003 
(0.019) 
Constant 0.496* 
(0.27) 
-0.274 
(0.282) 
R2 0.1556 0.252 
432 n 432 
Investment efficiency is identified as an outcome determined by a number of 
explanatory factors, and is defined for the purposes of evaluation as 
inefficiency. The values are standardized by absolute value: under and over-
investment are each denoted as positive values. Tax-only and trade-only 
treatments are measured in comparison to the staged transition treatment, 
which is utilized as the baseline for purposes of comparison. 
As demonstrated by the significance results from the panel analysis, the tax 
and transition regimes help the lower-efficiency producers in their investment 
decisions more than the trading only regulation. In the simpler random effects 
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specification (Model 1), the tax-only treatment is significantly correlated with 
lower investment efficiency than the transition treatment; the transition 
treatment was not different from the trade-only. Both low-efficiency and high-
efficiency producers invest at significantly less-efficient investment 
magnitudes than do medium-efficiency producers in all treatments. Model 2 
suggests that the efficiency of low-efficiency producers’ investment decisions 
is not significantly different under the tax compared to the transition 
treatment, but the least efficient producers invest significantly less efficiently 
under the trade only treatment. The treatment effects remain significant even 
when other possible explanatory factors (the total number of upgrades in the 
market, the previous round’s permit price) are controlled for. 
5.2 Emissions 
Emissions are the number of permits (inputs) used for production. Permits 
were used during both the pre-liability and regulated phases. During the pre-
liability phase, an unlimited amount of permits was available to producers at 
no cost, while the target emissions level was 320 during the regulated phase.  
5.2.1 Full Round Emissions 
Emissions under the tax only and the transition schemes were not statistically 
different when compared over all rounds, but were generally highest in the 
trade-only treatment. In round one, emissions were highest under trading-only 
and lowest in the transition treatment; the difference was marginally 
insignificant at the 95 percent significance level (p = 0.055). Emissions in the 
final round were highest under trading only regulation and lowest under the 
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tax only; emissions were significantly higher in the trading only (p = 0.016) 
and transition (p = 0.037) than the tax only (Figure 5.2).  
Figure 5.2 Emissions 
The red line denotes the maximum emissions in pre-liability phase plus the 
capped emissions level L* in liability periods 
 
 
5.2.2 Emissions under Regulation 
The timing of participants’ investment decisions in the pre-regulation phase, 
whose effect was not intended for close study under this experimental model, 
imposes a noisy effect on the emissions generated in the pre-regulation phase. 
To ensure the validity of the analysis of emissions levels, emissions were also 
evaluated in the regulated phase only, eliminating consideration of the pre-
regulation phase emissions. In round one, liability phase emissions were 
highest under trading only and the lowest in the transition (p = 0.05). In the 
regulated phase of the fourth round, emissions were higher in the transitional 
scheme (p = 0.054), and the trading-only scheme (p = 0.007) than in the tax. 
Accounting for all rounds, emissions under the tax and the transition scheme 
were not statistically different, but emissions were markedly lower in the 
staged transition than in the trading-only regulation (p = 0.055) (Figure 5.3). 
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Figure 5.3 Emissions under Regulation 
L* denoted by red line 
 
5.3 Production Income 
While low-efficiency producers produced at their highest levels under the 
trading only scheme, medium and high-efficiency producers produced most, 
and therefore generated their highest production revenue, under the tax. In 
round 4, low-efficiency producer types produced significantly more under the 
trading only scheme than under the tax only (p = 0.002), and more under the 
staged transitional scheme than the tax (p = 0.044). The low-efficiency 
producers’ highest revenue lower than the high efficiency producers’: by 
utilizing permits to produce, low-efficiency producers high production levels 
reduced overall welfare. Low-efficiency producers’ production revenues were 
significantly higher under the staged transition than tax only (p = 0.008) and 
higher under the trade only scheme than staged transition (p = 0.007) when 
measured over all rounds. Despite the significant differences measured in 
producer efficiency groups, the difference between market-aggregated 
production incomes was not statistically significant between treatments. 
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5.4 Allocative Efficiency 
The efficiency measure discussed in Subchapter 3.6 accounts for the 
proportion of total surplus observed in the experiment compared to the total 
theoretical surplus. 10  A higher efficiency score indicates a lower total 
compliance cost (abatement plus damage cost) incurred. Overall cost is 
consistently lower under the staged transition scheme than under the trading-
only scheme and higher than under the tax-only scheme. 
5.4.1 Full round allocative efficiency 
Overall cost is consistently lower under the staged transition scheme than 
under the trading-only scheme and higher than under the tax-only scheme 
(Figure 5.4, Table 5.5). The tax-only treatment was more efficient than 
trading-only in the first round (p = 0.078) and more efficient than the staged 
transition overall (p = 0.037). In the final round, the tax was consistently more 
efficient than the trading only scheme, although the difference was marginally 
insignificant (p = 0.109). When accounting for all rounds, the tax only regime 
was significantly more efficient than the transition scheme (p = 0.037). The 
difference between the staged transition regime and trading only was not 
significant under this measure, when taking all rounds into account. 
                                                
10 Social welfare TS is comprised of producer surplus (production revenue minus costs), the 
government surplus, and consumer surplus: !" = (!!!! !!) − !"!!!!! !!,! −!!!!!"#! + !!"!!!!! − !"!!!! . Dividing the observed TS by the maximum possible TS* and 
multiplying by 100 yields allocative efficiency.!
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Figure 5.4 Allocative Efficiency 
 
Table 5.5 Allocative Efficiency 
Means, Standard Deviation in Parentheses 
 
 
Round Overall by 
Treatment 
 
1 2 3 4 
Tax Only 36% 67% 74% 82% 65% 
(16%) (16%) (16%) (15%) (23%) 
Staged 
Transition 
24% 50% 61% 69% 51% 
(17%) (11%) (12%) (8%) (21%) 
Trade 
Only 
19% 39% 52% 66% 44% 
(15%) (21%) (13%) (12%) (23%) 
 
5.4.2 Allocative Efficiency Under Regulation 
Production incomes and emissions created prior to the regulation can be 
removed from analysis by restricting efficiency accounting to the regulated 
phase only, eliminating a possibly misleading effect caused by the timing of 
participants’ investment decisions during the pre-liability period, allowing for 
clearer assessment of the effect of regulation. Measuring allocative efficiency 
under the regulation-only clearly points to the superior performance of the 
transition scheme when compared to the trading only regime. Investment 
outlays under the transition and trading only regimes in the initial round were 
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so large that they outweighed revenue, yielding negative allocative efficiency. 
While a learning effect toward higher allocative efficiency with consecutive 
rounds was observed in all three treatments, the staged transition was 
significantly more efficient than the trading-only regime (p = 0.004), albeit 
less efficient than the tax-only (p = 0.002). Regulated phase efficiency was 
observably higher and varied less under the staged transition than trading-only 
in the final round, but the difference between these two regimes in the final 
round was insignificant (Figure 5.5, Table 5.6).  
Figure 5.5 Regulated Allocative Efficiency 
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Table 5.6 Regulated Allocative Efficiency 
Means and Standard Deviations11 
 
 
Round Overall by 
Treatment 
 
1 2 3 4 
Tax Only 9% 52% 67% 76% 51% 
(14%) (22%) (22%) (14%) (31%) 
Staged 
Transition 
-10% 28% 50% 61% 32% 
(19%) (11%) (12%) (12%) (31%) 
Trade 
Only 
-21% 9% 28% 47% 16% 
(19%) (28%) (21%) (22%) (35%) 
 
5.5 Permit Trading 
Under the social welfare-maximizing solution, medium and high-efficiency 
producers should invest in abatement and then produce at high levels, 
purchasing the permits they require in excess of their allotment in the market. 
To maximize their profits, low-efficiency producers should neither invest nor 
produce, but sell their permit allocation (when the market is active). 
5.5.1 Quantity Transacted 
Significantly fewer permits were traded per period under the trade-only 
scheme than the transition regime. With the exception of round 1, significantly 
more permits changed hands per period under the transition scheme than the 
trading only scheme (p < 0.001 each round, when only the first 5 periods with 
trade and also when all periods with trade are accounted for) (Table 5.7). 
 
                                                
11 Negative allocative efficiency reflects investment costs that heavily outweigh the surplus. 
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Table 5.7 Volume of Permits traded per Period 
Averaged by Round and Treatment 
 
 Round 
Overall 
Theoretically 
Expected 
Optimum  1 2 3 4 
Staged 
Transition 
4.57 9.83 12.07 12.17 9.66 15 
(2.98) (2.14) (2.52) (2.67) (4.02) 
Trade 
Only 
4.20 6.83 7.47 9.73 7.06 15 
(2.70) (2.27) (2.11) (2.50) (3.09) 
Overall by 
Round  
4.38 8.33 9.77 10.95 8.36 15 
(2.82) (2.66) (3.27) (2.84) (3.81) 
 
High efficiency producers’ relatively lower production levels under the trading 
only regime are attributable to the supply of permits available to them in the 
market. Under the social welfare-maximizing solution, 15 permits would be 
traded per period, but in the observed environment, markedly fewer changed 
hands. Fewer permits were traded under the trading-only regime, suggesting 
that under great uncertainty, the less-efficient producers preferred to upgrade 
their production technology, and then hold and produce with their allocated 
permits rather than sell them in the market (even at prices higher than the 
marginal revenue they could generate per permit via production!). An inability 
to acquire sufficient permits confined the more-efficient producers’ ability to 
produce at high levels.  
5.5.2 Prices 
Table 5.8 provides a summary of permits’ transacted prices. Mean and median 
transaction prices observed in the market were higher than the competitive 
equilibrium prediction under both regimes with trading, although prices seem 
to have been significantly affected by the regulation type. When compared via 
individual round or overall, transacted prices were significantly higher (further 
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from the competitive equilibrium prediction) in the trading-only treatment 
than the transition treatment (overall p < 0.001).12 Prices, and the range in 
transacted prices, declined from early rounds to the later rounds in both 
treatments but there was no significant difference in the speed of decline. The 
range of transacted prices was much wider in the trading-only treatment than 
the transition treatment when comparisons were made within the first two 
rounds (p = 0.037) or in the last two rounds (p = 0.001).  
Table 5.8 Permit Prices 
 
  Round Overall by 
Treatment   1 2 3 4 
Staged  
Transition 
18.43 17.13 16.79 16.43 16.95 
(5.99) (6.15) (4.44) (4.11) (5.06) 
Trading 
Only (All 
Periods) 
22.22 19.45 19.09 17.45 19.16 
(7.08) (11.26) (8.21) (4.67) (8.08) 
Trading 
Only (first 
5 trading 
periods) 
 
21.49 20.10 19.63 17.74 19.37 
(6.88) (13.80) (9.68) (4.49) (9.29) 
 
Speculative trading, in the sense of producers buying permits in excess of their 
own needs with the purpose of reselling them to other producers, was not 
observed in either treatment. 
5.6 Preferences and Earnings 
In response to the preference survey, participants indicated that they liked the 
tax-only liability least, transition more, and the trading-only scheme most. The 
                                                
12 The result of higher prices under higher investment levels is due to inefficient investment 
strategies and producers’ subsequent values for permits. Sanin and Zanaj (2011), for example, 
model a market in which investment in abatement will lead to higher permit prices. 
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staged transition was liked significantly more than the tax scheme (p = 0.025). 
No significant difference between liking of the staged transition and trading-
only scheme was reported. 
Due to the free allocation of permits in the regulations with trading, producers’ 
Experimental dollar earnings were higher in the trading-only regime than the 
transitional (p < 0.01) and the tax (p < 0.01). These differences in the E$ 
earnings were significant in all rounds and for all producer types, except for 
round 1, in which Producer 1 earned a statistically equivalent amount under 
the transition and trading regimes. Taxes collected were higher under the tax-
only than transitional (p < 0.01) and trading-only schemes (p < 0.01). These 
differences in the E$ earnings were significant in all rounds and for all 
producer types, except for round 1, in which Participant 1 earned a statistically 
equivalent amount under the transition and trading only regimes. 
The Experimental dollar: Australian dollar exchange rates used in the 
experiment were calibrated so that potential take-home earnings were the 
same for all participants in all treatments. While participants’ E$ earnings 
were higher in the trading-only than the transition regime (p < 0.01) and the 
tax (p < 0.01), cash payouts (A$) were higher in the tax-only treatment than 
trading-only (p < 0.001) and transition (p = 0.003) (Table 5.9).  
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Table 5.9 Average Individual Earnings (A$), by Round and Treatment 
 
 Round Average Round Earnings, by 
Treatment Treatment 1 2 3 4 
Tax Only 4.59 6.52 6.88 6.92 6.23 
(2.0) (1.29) (0.93) (0.99) (1.66) 
Staged 
Transition 
4.81 6.07 6.46 6.70 6.01 
(1.59) (1.61) (1.12) (1.19) (1.56) 
Trade 
Only 
5.11 6.02 6.35 6.61 6.02 
(1.48) (1.54) (1.45) (1.13) (1.51) 
 
5.7 Framework robustness 
A concern when implementing the complex experimental design was ensuring 
that the results would be meaningful and applicable. In designing this study, 
key attention was paid to developing mechanisms that participants would 
easily understand. The main goal was to ensure that the observed behavior 
would result from the key mechanisms being manipulated and tested, and 
would not, alternatively, be arbitrarily affected by unintentional factors.  
Several measures were undertaken in order to minimize and test for 
participants’ understanding. The feedback and results from these ventures are 
encouraging. Participants performed well on a comprehension quiz they took 
after receiving instructions (before the start of the first round of play). 
Participants observably focused on their investment decisions during the 
course of the sessions (using the on-screen calculator and taking notes in 
advance of selecting upgrades).  
Under both the transition and trading only treatments, participants responded 
very positively to the preference survey in the first round, which was 
implemented to probe for their frustration with the regulation. The results are 
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summarized in Table 5.10. Participants responded to two survey questions 
prior to the first regulated phase, then immediately following the first 
regulated phase, and, in half of the sessions, after the completion of the fourth 
round. The participants used radio buttons to express their agreement (“Highly 
Disagree” to “Highly Agree” on a scale from 0 to 10) with the prompts: “I like 
Periods 1-5,” (a in the below Table) and “I like Periods 6-13” (b in the below 
Table).  
Table 5.10 Survey Responses 
 
 Prior to first Regulation After Round 1 After Round 4 
Treatment a b a b a b 
Tax Only 8.0 (2.3) 
3.6 
(2.6) 
8.3 
(1.9) 
3.7 
(3.4) 
8.91 
(1.8) 
2.63 
(3.6) 
Staged 
Transition 
7.6 
(2.62) 
4.3 
(2.3) 
7.0 
(2.9) 
6.5 
(2.8) 
6.45 
(3.7) 
7.25 
(2.9) 
Trade 
Only 
7.4 
(3.0) 
5.6 
(2.4) 
6.5 
(2.8) 
6.7 
(2.5) 
5.92 
(3.2) 
6.4 
(3.5) 
 
The participants’ positive responses lend support for the assumption that 
behaviour was indeed affected by the nature of the regulation (and not, 
conversely, somehow due solely to chance). In fact, participants express 
higher preference for the regulation (b) under the trade only and staged 
transition treatments than under the tax only in all three of the surveys. At the 
first survey, the transition and trade only regulations were liked significantly 
more than the tax (p = 0.025 and p < 0.001, respectively). The differences in 
“like” of the regulatory regimes remained significant in subsequent surveys. 
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There was no significant difference in preference for the transition and trade 
only regimes in any of the surveys. 
5.8 Summary of Chapter Five 
 
Results of 18 experimental sessions were presented in this chapter. In addition 
to general results for the full market, relevant trends specific to three 
categories of producers’ efficiencies (low efficiency, medium efficiency, high 
efficiency) were noted. In the experiments, low-efficiency producers behaved 
according to their profit-maximizing solution by producing little or not at all 
under the tax and transition schemes, but invested and produced at high levels 
under the trading-only regime. Medium and high-efficiency producers 
generated their highest levels of production under the tax, less under the 
transition and least under the trading only regime. Overall performance of the 
regulations was evaluated mainly by allocative efficiency, a measure of social 
welfare comprised of investment costs, emissions damages and production 
income. The tax only regime was most efficient, the transition less efficient, 
and the trade only regime the least efficient. The permit market was observed 
via the prices and quantities of permits traded: more permits were traded in the 
staged transition than the trading-only regime, while the prices were 
statistically higher under the trading only regime than transitional. Finally, 
participants’ earnings were reported and reported preferences discussed.  
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Chapter 6. Discussion and Conclusion  
 
A new CO2 emissions regulation consisting of a staged transition from a tax to 
a permit market has been implemented in Australia. To allow controlled 
comparison of the effectiveness of such a regime to the more traditional tax-
only and trade-only emissions regulations, an experiment based on a model of 
the three regulatory regimes was designed and executed. The results 
demonstrate that a transition regime may yield less costly compliance in its 
first phase when compared to an emission-trading scheme implemented in 
isolation, and seem to suggest that a transitional regime could yield preferable 
outcomes to a trading only scheme.  
6.1 Overview of results  
As measured in this study, both an environment regulated by a tax, and one 
governed by a regime with a staged transition incurred lower total compliance 
costs than did an experimental environment operating under the trading-only 
regime. The transition regime yielded more costly compliance than the tax 
only but less costly than trade only regulation. The bulk of the higher costs in 
the trading-only and transition treatments were due to the inefficient 
abatement investments made by inefficient producers. Inefficient producers 
were most likely to unproductively invest heavily in abatement, hold their 
permits and produce under the trading treatment than they were under the tax 
and transition schemes. The related eventual low supply of permits eliminated 
an opportunity for more efficient producers to generate as much income as 
would have otherwise been possible, and in turn, reduced total welfare.  
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6.2 Discussion 
Forming the basis for this study was a concern that new cap and trade regimes 
lead liable producers to upgrade their technologies in ways unforeseen by 
regulators and analysts, thereby affecting permits’ future prices in directions 
(high or low) that are unanticipated. Associated uncertainty about permit 
prices disrupts producers’ investment optimization.  
A market regulated by a tax ! was hypothesized to fare better (incur lower 
costs) than would one regulated by a new trading setup with cap L*. A market 
with a staged transition between tax and trading was thought to perform 
somewhere in between. Specifically, producers were predicted to successfully 
optimize to reach cost minimizing investment decisions under a tax-only 
system, but fail to do so in a trade-only regime. 
Under a trading system in this experimental setup, it seems that it is more 
difficult for the less efficient producers to identify themselves as such, so they 
invest more in costly abatement than in the other treatments, reducing social 
welfare. Price uncertainty in the newly created market and what seems to be 
an endowment-related effect of initial permit allocation both contribute to 
inefficiency in abatement decisions and a slower learning process 
demonstrated under the regulations that include trading. Implementing a 
temporary tax in the transition reduces some of the costly effects observed in 
the trade-only regime. Even with the extensive opportunity for learning and 
information gathering that the setup provided in the multiple rounds, and even 
though the average prices that emerged in the market were not substantially 
higher than the tax level, the decision makers incurred excessive compliance 
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costs in the early and latter rounds of the sessions with trading compared to 
the tax sessions. 
The results suggest that a well-designed transition from an emissions tax to a 
tradable permit scheme can yield benefits when compared to an application of 
an emissions trading scheme. The beneficial effect seems to be due to the 
temporary tax’s resolution of uncertainty about compliance costs in the early 
stages of the regulation’s implementation. Results presented in this thesis are 
contingent on specific parameters (tax level, producers’ production 
characteristics, cap severity) that were modeled in this study, and should be 
tested more robustly before implemented.  
Practitioners considering a staged transition regime may find additional 
concerns with the multi-step regulation. The primary concern that comes to 
mind is the tax !’s correlation with the unit price p that would eventually arise 
in a permit market in a transition regime. If ! is not equal to p, or if ! is not 
equal to the expected p, producers’ incentives to invest will be affected by a 
weighted combination of the prices. The combination would be weighted 
based on the expected duration of the tax and the expected duration of the 
trading scheme. This concern has not been investigated in this experimental 
setup, but seems worthy of closer study. 
Liable entities’ confidence that the regulation will actually be implemented 
and enforced in the manner it is reported to is a closely related concern. Low 
confidence that a proposed regulation will be enforced presents additional 
uncertainty and noise to the expected unit price for emissions. Considering the 
political discord that is often present during the implementation of 
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environmental policy, entities may predict that the reported enforcement will 
be revised, or at an extreme, short-lived. Naturally, an opportunity to 
manipulate the political environment in order to eliminate costly regulations 
may be eagerly seized by industry representatives. Jotzo and Jordan (2012) 
found a high level of policy uncertainty amongst representatives of Australian 
firms reported a lack of confidence that the carbon price would be enforced in 
Australia in the medium term, even after the first step of the carbon regulation 
was implemented. Policy uncertainty may be exacerbated by a transition 
design, which is concerning.  
Costliness of simple confusion regarding the additional step inherent in a 
transitional regime is another concern. The additional step on its own may 
cause confusion in liable entities, yielding higher emissions, less-than efficient 
investment strategies, or both. The regulator must evaluate whether these 
concerns may be outweighed by the potential benefits of an introductory tax. 
Forming the basis for this study was a concern that new cap and trade regimes 
lead liable producers to dramatically upgrade their technologies in ways 
unforeseen by regulators and analysts, thereby affecting permits’ future prices 
in directions that often cannot be anticipated. Associated uncertainty about 
permit prices disrupts producers’ investment optimization calculations. 
Excessive investment in abatement upgrades during Phase 1 of the United 
States’ SO2 market has been pointed to as a cause of unexpectedly low early 
allowance prices (Schmalensee, et al. (1998)). An initial allocation effect has 
been pointed to as a possible cause for lower-than-expected trading volumes in 
the EU Emissions Trading System (Murphy and Stranlund (2007)). The 
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volatile carbon certificate prices in the early stages of the European Emissions 
Trading Scheme exacerbated uncertainty and reduced confidence in future 
returns on investment in abatement (Jung (2012)).   
In spite of the danger of higher than necessary compliance costs, emissions 
trading schemes, especially those that include permit grandfathering, are 
favored by businesses over taxes. The experiment’s survey responses suggest 
this preference among this study’s participants, even though participants 
earned less under trading treatments than tax treatments (of course, an 
alternate and untestable explanation for the preference communicated via the 
survey was participants’ preference for activity in the trade treatment 
compared to the stagnancy in the tax treatment).  
The potential benefits enjoyed by a long-running, well-regulated permit 
market may ensure that quantity rather than price is the efficient regulatory 
instrument in the long term. But, as clearly observed in this lab setup, the 
uncertainties of a new trading environment can lead to inefficient compliance 
strategies and higher-than necessary compliance costs. An introductory tax 
may reduce the costs.  
In spite of the extensive opportunity for decision makers had to learn through 
four rounds, and though producers received reliable information regarding the 
regulation and the aggregate abatement investments, the trading-only 
regulation performed worse than did the transitional system in this setup. This 
suggests that the temporary resolution of cost uncertainty provided by the tax 
in the transition regime is important.  
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6.3 Final remarks 
These results appear to be helpful in guiding thinking and discussion about 
implications of regulatory structures, and it is hoped that the findings 
contribute to the first stages of what is hoped to be a wider study of this type 
of innovative regime. Further attention should be paid to the implications of a 
transition regime, with regards to the opportunity of gains from trade in an 
emissions market that allows for the entry of new firms, innovation in 
available technology, and the degree to which the temporary tax rate acts as a 
price anchor in the permit market. A comparison of the three regime designs 
discussed in this study, with auctioned permit allocation rather than free 
permit allocation, would provide a more complete overview of the outcomes 
of the regulations’ implementation. A seemingly important direction of study 
would be to analyze the effect of a clearly inefficient tax on costs and 
efficiency. Another intriguing extension of this work would be to explore the 
characteristics of a regulation that would include a transition from trading to a 
tax regime, with the stage 2 tax level to be selected based on the prevailing 
price that permits were traded for in the stage 1 trading period.  
This study has aimed to provide useful insight to legislators, businesses and 
lobbyists while shedding light on the benefits a transitional regulation could 
yield a wide swath of stakeholders. Curbing emissions effectively on a global 
scale requires creative solutions: application of tested, innovative regulative 
strategies such as a staged-transition may prove to be widely useful, not only 
in Australia.  
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Appendix Table 1: Exchange Rates (E$ to AU$1) 
 
 
Appendix Table 2: Social Welfare Maximizing Investment Levels 
 
Producer 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Aggregate 
Level 0 0 0 3 3 2 1 1 10 
Cost (E$) 0 0 0 225 225 150 75 125 800 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Producer Tax Only Staged Transition Trade Only 
1 E$50 E$103 E$135 
2 67 120 152 
3 83 137 169 
4 111 164 195 
5 154 207 239 
6 190 243 275 
7 226 280 312 
8 263 316 348 
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Appendix 2: Selected zTree screenshots 
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Participant Investment Screen 
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Participant Production Screen, No Trading  
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Participant Production Screen, with Trading 
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End of Period Summary Screen 
End of Period Summary Screen 
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Appendix 3: Participant Instructions and Quiz 
 
These instructions were distributed to participants via hard copy, and via a video13, at 
the beginning of each experiment session. In the sessions with trading, the “Input 
Trading” portion of the instructions was distributed and viewed immediately before 
the first trading period. 
 
  
                                                
13 Instructions videos can be downloaded via Dropbox or viewed on YouTube. Links are provided in the 
reference list (Bernold 2012(a – e)). 
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Tax Treatment Instructions 
 
This is an experiment in market decision making.  You will be paid for your 
participation in cash at the end of the experiment.  Different participants may earn 
different amounts.  What you earn will depend on your decisions and the decisions of 
others. 
 
The experiment will take place through computer terminals at which you are seated.  
We will start with a detailed instruction video.  If you have any questions regarding 
the instructions, raise your hand at the conclusion of the video and your question will 
be answered so everyone can hear.  If any difficulties arise after the experiment has 
begun, raise your hand and a monitor will come and assist you privately. 
 
At the end of this video you will be asked to complete a quiz that will ensure your 
understanding of the instructions.  From now on, you will only interact with each 
other via computers.  
 
Today’s experiment is comprised of 4 separate rounds.  Each round will last for 13 
periods.  Each period will consist of an investment stage followed by a production 
stage with an exception of Period 1.  Period 1 will only have a production stage.  In 
each round, you will be a producer in a market that is composed of 8 producers, and 
your earnings will be based on the profitability of your decisions.  
 
 
Production Stage 
You will choose a Production Level each period.  Each Production Level will 
generate a certain Production Income and will need a certain number of Required 
Inputs. At the start of each round, all 8 producers will need the same number of 
Required Inputs for the Production Level.  Producers will earn different Production 
Incomes for each Production Level. 
 
Each period, you may choose to produce at any level between 0 (at which you will 
produce nothing, earn no income and will require no inputs) and 10. The number of 
Required Inputs that are needed for each Production Level is visible on the right side 
of the production table.  Every Production Level requires some number of inputs.  If 
you do not hold sufficient amount of inputs for your chosen Production Level at the 
end of a period, you will be automatically charged the Input Price for each 
Insufficient Input.  The current Input Price per insufficient (i.e. required but not held) 
input is displayed in the top left corner of the production screen, along with the total 
Expenses Due for the insufficient inputs at the currently selected Production Level. 
 
Your production options are on the left side of the screen.  You may choose a 
Production Level at which to produce for the current period by clicking a “Select 
Level” button to the left of each level.  Your currently selected Production Level is 
always bolded and highlighted in yellow. Once you have made your final decision 
and are ready to move on, click the “Continue” button on the top right of the screen.  
The period will end when the time expires or when the last person has clicked the 
“Continue” button. 
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Your Balance will be updated with your Production Income at the end of each 
period’s production stage.  At the conclusion of each production stage, you will see a 
summary of your performance for the period.  The Summary Screen displays your 
Held Inputs, Required Inputs, Insufficient Inputs, Input Price, Expenses Due, and 
Balance as of the end of the Period.   
 
 
Investment Stage 
Starting in Period 2, you may invest to reduce the number of Required Inputs needed 
for production.  An opportunity to invest will be presented to you prior to each 
period’s production stage. Each investment stage will last for 60 seconds.  Any 
investment you make will take effect in the current period, and will lower your 
Required Inputs for all of the remaining periods in the round.   
 
By investing once, the Required Inputs for each Production Level will be reduced by 
10 percent.  Investments are additive, meaning that if you make multiple investments, 
your originally Required Inputs will be reduced by the sum of the respective percent 
reduction levels.  For example, choosing two 10 percent investments would reduce 
the number of Required Inputs by 20 percent, so if the initial number of Required 
Inputs is 10, this requirement would be 8 inputs after two investments.  You can see 
your current production schedule on the left side of the screen during the investment 
stage. 
 
You will have the opportunity to invest before each production stage starting in 
Period 2, and may invest at most once per period.  Each investment has a cost.  The 
Investment Cost is deducted from your Balance when you click the “Invest” button. 
Investment options and costs will not change during today’s experiment. 
 
 
Input Prices 
For the first 5 periods of each Round, the Input Price for each Insufficient Input will 
be E$0.  Starting in Period 6 of each round, you will be charged an Input Price of 
E$16 for each Insufficient Input.  The total Expenses Due in connection with the 
Insufficient Inputs will be denoted in the upper left area of your screen.  For example, 
if you need 8 Required Inputs, your Expenses Due will be E$16 times 8, or E$144. 
 
 
Summary 
You are a producer in a market composed of 8 producers.  You may select a 
Production Level between 0 and 10 each period.  You will earn Production Income 
and submit Required Inputs in association with your chosen Production Level. From 
Period 6 onwards, you will be charged E$16 for each Insufficient Input.  You may 
choose to make investments that will reduce your Required Inputs (at most one 
investment per period).   
 
At all times during the Investment and Production stages, you may access a calculator 
by clicking the icon in the bottom right corner of your screen. 
 
At the conclusion of each production stage, you will see a summary of your 
performance for the period. The Summary Screen displays your Held Inputs, 
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Required Inputs, Insufficient Inputs, Input Price, Expenses Due and Balance as of the 
end of the period.  The Summary Screen also displays the total number of investments 
that the 8 Producers in the market have completed as of the current period. 
 
At the end of each round your remaining Balance will be converted into cash. The 
rate of experimental dollars to Australian dollars at which you will be paid is 
displayed on your screen. Your earnings from all four rounds will be added and paid 
to you in cash at the end of the experiment. 
 
Thank you for your attention. If you have any questions, please raise your hand. 
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Staged Transitional Treatment Instructions 
This is an experiment in market decision making.  You will be paid for your 
participation in cash at the end of the experiment.  Different participants may earn 
different amounts.  What you earn will depend on your decisions and the decisions of 
others. 
 
The experiment will take place through computer terminals at which you are seated.  
We will start with a detailed instruction video.  If you have any questions regarding 
the instructions, please raise your hand at the conclusion of the video and your 
question will be answered so everyone can hear.  If any difficulties arise after the 
experiment has begun, raise your hand and a monitor will come and assist you 
privately. 
 
At the end of this video you will be asked to complete a quiz that will ensure your 
understanding of the instructions.  From now on, you will only interact with each 
other via computers.  
 
Today’s experiment is comprised of 4 separate rounds.  Each round will last for 13 
periods.  Each period will consist of an investment stage followed by a production 
stage with an exception of Period 1.  Period 1 will only have a production stage.  In 
each round, you will be a producer in a market that is composed of 8 producers, and 
your earnings will be based on the profitability of your decisions.  
 
 
Production Stage 
You will choose a Production Level each period.  Each Production Level will 
generate a certain Production Income and will need a certain number of Required 
Inputs. At the start of each Round, all 8 producers will need the same number of 
Required Inputs for each Production Level.  Each producer will earn different 
Production Income for each Production Level. 
 
You may choose to produce at any level between 0 (at which you will produce 
nothing, earn no income and will require no inputs) and 10. The number of Required 
Inputs that are needed for each Production Level is visible on the right side of the 
production table.  Every Production Level requires some number of inputs.  If you do 
not hold a sufficient number of inputs for your chosen Production Level at the end of 
a period, you will be automatically charged the Input Price for each Insufficient Input.  
The current Input Price per insufficient (i.e. required but not held) input is displayed 
in the top left corner of the production screen, along with the total Expenses Due for 
the insufficient inputs at the currently selected Production Level. 
 
Your production options are on the left side of the screen.  You may choose a 
Production Level at which to produce for the current period by clicking a “Select 
Level” button to the left of each level.  Your currently selected Production Level is 
always bolded and highlighted in yellow. Once you have made your final decision 
and are ready to move on, click the “Continue” button on the top right of the screen.  
The period will end when the time expires or when the last person has clicked the 
“Continue” button. 
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Your Balance will be updated with your Production Income at the end of the 
production stage.  At the conclusion of each production stage, you will see a summary 
of your performance for the period. 
 
 
Investment Stage 
Starting in Period 2, you may invest to reduce the number of Required Inputs needed 
for production.  An opportunity to invest will be presented to you prior to each 
period’s production stage. Each investment stage will last for 60 seconds.  Any 
investment you make will take effect in the current period, and will lower your 
Required Inputs for all of the remaining periods in the round.   
 
By investing once, the Required Inputs for each Production Level will be reduced by 
10 percent.  Investments are additive, meaning that if you make multiple investments, 
your originally Required Inputs will be reduced by the sum of the respective percent 
reduction levels.  For example, choosing two 10 percent investments would reduce 
the number of Required Inputs by 20 percent, so if the initial number of Required 
Inputs is 10, this requirement would be 8 inputs after two investments.  You can see 
your current production schedule on the left side of the screen during the Investment 
Stage. 
 
You will have the opportunity to invest before each production stage starting in 
Period 2, and may invest at most once per period.  Each investment has a cost.  The 
Investment Cost is deducted from your Balance when you click the “Invest” button. 
Your investment options and costs will not change during today’s experiment. 
 
 
Input Prices 
For the first 5 periods of each Round, the Input Price for each Insufficient Input will 
be E$0.  In Periods 6, 7 and 8 of each round, you will be charged an Input Price of 
E$16 for each Insufficient Input.  The total Expenses Due in connection with the 
Insufficient Inputs will be denoted in the upper left area of your screen.  For example, 
if you need 8 Required Inputs, your Expenses Due will be E$16 times 8, or E$144. 
  
Starting in Period 9 and for the remainder of each of the rounds, you will each receive 
5 inputs each period.  You may buy and sell inputs to satisfy your requirements and to 
maximize your earnings.  If you do not hold sufficient inputs to satisfy the Required 
Inputs at the end of a period, you will be required to pay a new Input Price of E$32 
for each insufficient input.  For example, if you have 7 Held Inputs at the end of a 
period and need 9 Required Inputs, your Expenses Due will be E$32 times 2, or E$64.   
Inputs unused at the end of a period will not be available in future periods. You will 
receive more detailed instructions about trading later. 
 
 
Summary 
You are a producer in a market composed of 8 producers.  You will each choose to 
produce at a Production Level between 0 and 10 each period.  You will earn 
Production Income and submit Required Inputs in association with your chosen 
Production Level.  You may choose to make investments that will reduce your 
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Required Inputs (at most one investment per period).  In Periods 6, 7 and 8, you will 
be charged an Input Price of E$16 for each Insufficient Input.  Starting in Period 9 
and for the remainder of each round, you will receive 5 inputs each period.  You may 
then buy and sell inputs to satisfy your input requirements, and will be charged E$32 
for each Insufficient Input.   
 
At all times during the Investment and Production Stages, you may access a calculator 
by clicking the icon in the bottom right corner of your screen. 
 
At the conclusion of each production stage, you will see a summary of your 
performance for the period.  The Summary Screen displays your Held Inputs, 
Required Inputs, Insufficient Inputs, Input Price, Expenses Due, and Balance as of the 
end of the Period.  The Summary Screen also displays the total number of investments 
that the 8 Producers in the market have completed as of the current Period. 
 
At the end of each round your remaining Balance will be converted into cash. The 
rate of experimental dollars to Australian dollars at which you will be paid is 
displayed on your screen. Your earnings from all four rounds will be added and paid 
to you in cash at the end of the experiment. 
 
Thank you for your attention. If you have any questions, please raise your hand. 
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Trading Treatment Instructions 
 
This is an experiment in market decision making.  You will be paid for your 
participation in cash at the end of the experiment.  Different participants may earn 
different amounts.  What you earn will depend on your decisions and the decisions of 
others. 
 
The experiment will take place through computer terminals at which you are seated.  
We will start with a detailed instruction video.  If you have any questions regarding 
the instructions, raise your hand at the conclusion of the video and your question will 
be answered so everyone can hear.  If any difficulties arise after the experiment has 
begun, raise your hand and a monitor will come and assist you privately. 
 
At the end of this video you will be asked to complete a quiz that will ensure your 
understanding of the instructions.  From now on, you will only interact with each 
other via computers.  
 
Today’s experiment is comprised of 4 separate rounds.  Each round will last for 13 
periods.  Each period will consist of an investment stage followed by a production 
stage with an exception of Period 1.  Period 1 will only have a production stage.  In 
each round, you will be a producer in a market that is composed of 8 producers, and 
your earnings will be based on the profitability of your decisions.  
 
 
Production Stage 
You will choose a Production Level each period.  Each Production Level will 
generate a certain Production Income and will need a certain number of Required 
Inputs. At the start of each round, all 8 producers will need the same number of 
Required Inputs for the Production Level.  Producers will earn different Production 
Incomes for each Production Level. 
 
Each period, you may choose to produce at any level between 0 (at which you will 
produce nothing, earn no income and will require no inputs) and 10. The number of 
Required Inputs that are needed for each Production Level is visible on the right side 
of the production table.  Every Production Level requires some number of inputs.  If 
you do not hold sufficient amount of inputs for your chosen Production Level at the 
end of a period, you will be automatically charged the Input Price for each 
Insufficient Input.  The current Input Price per insufficient (i.e. required but not held) 
input is displayed in the top left corner of the production screen, along with the total 
Expenses Due for the insufficient inputs at the currently selected Production Level. 
 
Your production options are on the left side of the screen.  You may choose a 
Production Level at which to produce for the current period by clicking a “Select 
Level” button to the left of each level.  Your currently selected Production Level is 
always bolded and highlighted in yellow. Once you have made your final decision 
and are ready to move on, click the “Continue” button on the top right of the screen.  
The period will end when the time expires or when the last person has clicked the 
“Continue” button. 
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Your Balance will be updated with your Production Income at the end of each 
period’s production stage.  At the conclusion of each production stage, you will see a 
summary of your performance for the period.  The Summary Screen displays your 
Held Inputs, Required Inputs, Insufficient Inputs, Input Price, Expenses Due, and 
Balance as of the end of the Period.   
 
 
Investment Stage 
Starting in Period 2, you may invest to reduce the number of Required Inputs needed 
for production.  An opportunity to invest will be presented to you prior to each 
period’s production stage. Each investment stage will last for 60 seconds.  Any 
investment you make will take effect in the current period, and will lower your 
Required Inputs for all of the remaining periods in the round.   
 
By investing once, the Required Inputs for each Production Level will be reduced by 
10 percent.  Investments are additive, meaning that if you make multiple investments, 
your originally Required Inputs will be reduced by the sum of the respective percent 
reduction levels.  For example, choosing two 10 percent investments would reduce 
the number of Required Inputs by 20 percent, so if the initial number of Required 
Inputs is 10, this requirement would be 8 inputs after two investments.  You can see 
your current production schedule on the left side of the screen during the investment 
stage. 
 
You will have the opportunity to invest before each production stage starting in 
Period 2, and may invest at most once per period.  Each investment has a cost.  The 
Investment Cost is deducted from your Balance when you click the “Invest” button. 
Investment options and costs will not change during today’s experiment. 
 
 
Input Prices 
For the first 5 periods of each Round, the Input Price for each Insufficient Input is 
E$0.  Starting in Period 6 and for the remainder of the rounds, you will each receive 5 
free Inputs each period.  You may buy and sell Inputs to satisfy your requirements 
and to maximize your earnings.  If you do not hold sufficient Inputs to satisfy the 
Required Inputs at the end of a period, you will be required to pay a new Input Price 
of E$32 for each Insufficient Input.  For example, if you have 5 Held Inputs at the end 
of a period and need 8 Required Inputs, your Expenses Due will be E$32 times 3, or 
E$96.   Inputs unused at the end of a period will not be available in future periods. 
You will receive more detailed instructions about trading later. 
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Summary 
You are a producer in a market composed of 8 producers.  You will each choose to 
produce at a Production Level between 0 and 10 each period.  You will earn 
Production Income and submit Required Inputs in association with your chosen 
Production Level. From Period 6 onwards, you will receive 5 free inputs each period.  
You may then buy and sell inputs to satisfy your input requirements, and will be 
charged E$32 for each Insufficient Input.  You may choose to make investments that 
will reduce your Required Inputs (at most one investment per period).   
 
At all times during the Investment and Production Stages, you may access a calculator 
by clicking the icon in the bottom right corner of your screen. 
 
At the conclusion of each production stage, you will see a summary of your 
performance for the period.  The Summary Screen displays your Held Inputs, 
Required Inputs, Insufficient Inputs, Input Price, Expenses Due, and Balance as of the 
end of the Period.  The Summary Screen also displays the total number of investments 
that the 8 Producers in the market have completed as of the current Period. 
 
At the end of each round your remaining Balance will be converted into cash.  The 
rate of experimental dollars to Australian dollars at which you will be paid is 
displayed on your screen. Your earnings from all four rounds will be added and paid 
to you in cash at the end of the experiment. 
 
Thank you for your attention. If you have any questions, please raise your hand. 
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Input Trading14  
 
From now on, you will each receive 5 free inputs each period.  You may buy and sell 
inputs from each other to satisfy your input requirements while you are in the 
production stage of each period. 
  
The market box on the right side of the screen is divided into several areas.   
 
To offer to sell an input, click on the space under “Price you are willing to sell ($)” 
and enter the price that you are prepared to sell one input for.  When you are satisfied 
with your Sell Price, click the “Submit” button.   
 
To offer to buy an input, click on the space under “Price you are willing to buy ($)”  
and enter the price that you are prepared to buy one input for.  When you are satisfied 
with your Buy Offer, click the “Submit” button.  
 
You will see the current lowest Sell Offer and current lowest Buy Offer in the center 
area. When you see an Sell Offer at a price you would like to buy an input, select the 
Offer and click “Buy Input.” When you see a Buy Offer at a price you would like to 
sell an input, select the Offer and click “Sell Input.”  Your sales and purchases will 
instantly update your Balance and Held Inputs. 
 
Below, you can see the history of the recent prices of traded inputs.  
 
If you do not hold sufficient inputs to satisfy the number of Required Inputs at the end 
of a period, you will be required to pay the Price of E$32 for each Insufficient Input.  
Inputs unused at the end of a period will not be available in future periods and will not 
generate any additional income if held. 
                                                
14 These instructions were distributed in the hybrid and the pure emissions trading treatments. 
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Instructions Quiz 
 
This quiz was provided via a GoogleDoc, which required participants to provide 
correct answers to each question in order to proceed. The full version of the quiz is 
viewable via the link provided in the list of References (Bernold 2012). 
This quiz is designed to ensure your understanding of the experiment instructions.  
Please read and answer each question carefully. 
Question 1) Once in the production stage, how can you reduce the number of inputs 
that will be due at the end of the period? 
a. Sell inputs 
b. Buy inputs 
c. Reduce your selected Production Level 
d. Invest 
Question 2) If you change your Production Level, when will that change take effect? 
Please choose the best response. 
a. Immediately 
b. Last Period 
c. Next Period 
Question 3) How many Inputs will be required for a Production Level that was 
initially 10 inputs, following two 10% investments? 
a. 10 
b. 9 
c. 8.1 
d. 8 
Question 4) How many producers are in the market?  
a. 1 
b. 5 
c. 8 
d. 10 
Question 5) In Period 1, what is the price per Input that you use? 
a. $0 
b. $16 
c. $32 
d. This will depend on others 
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Question 6) In Period 7, what is the Price per Input that you use?15 
a. $16 
b. $5 
c. $32 
d. $0 
Question 7) For how many periods will each Round last? 
a. 2 
b. 3 
c. 13 
d. 10 
Question 8) What information do you receive about the other Producers' decisions? 
a. Their production levels. 
b. Their investments. 
c. Their Expenses Due. 
Thank you for completing the quiz. 
Please click the Submit button, and wait for further instructions. 
  
                                                
15 In the pure trading treatment, Question 6 read “In Period 7, what is the Price per Input that you use in 
excess of your Held Inputs?” The answer was “$32”. 
